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Africa Review

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12 December 1986

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
 Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
 Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,

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Africa Review

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Articles

**Zimbabwe: Upping the Ante
in Mozambique**

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Recent reports in the semiofficial Zimbabwean press, Prime Minister Mugabe's public statements, []

[] indicate that Harare is preparing to increase its 5,000-man force in Mozambique. We believe Mugabe intends primarily to roll back recent gains by the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) in central Mozambique and to provide greater protection for landlocked Zimbabwe's access to vital transportation arteries that run through Mozambique. Harare also probably wants to demonstrate solidarity with the government of newly selected Mozambican President Chissano. In our judgment, a heightened Zimbabwean commitment could result in short-term military gains but will not deal a decisive blow to the insurgents. Moreover, domestic and military opposition to the new campaign almost certainly will mount if Zimbabwean forces become further bogged down in intensified fighting and casualties continue to mount.

Zimbabwe's Involvement in Mozambique

Zimbabwe first sent troops to Mozambique in November 1982 to safeguard the pipeline, railway, and road that extend about 270 kilometers between the Mozambican port of Beira and the eastern Zimbabwean town of Mutare. In February 1984, Zimbabwean forces also began escorting convoys along the Zimbabwean-Malawian highway through Mozambique's Tete Province, and in June 1985 they undertook significant offensive operations against RENAMO for the first time. Embassy reporting indicates that Zimbabwean strength in Mozambique peaked in August 1985, when approximately 10,000 troops spearheaded an offensive that temporarily captured RENAMO headquarters at Casa Banana in Gorongosa National Park. []

Although Zimbabwean military actions resulted in a number of tactical successes, they did not deliver the decisive victories that Mugabe and the late Mozambican President Machel clearly had hoped for. At Casa Banana and elsewhere, for example, Mozambican forces were unable to hold key positions after joint operations ended and the Zimbabweans had withdrawn. []

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Most Zimbabwean troops currently in Mozambique are engaged in defending the Beira corridor, as well as undertaking modest offensive operations in the Gorongosa area. The Zimbabwean force, composed of a mechanized battalion and elements of at least five infantry battalions, is headquartered at Chimoio in central Mozambique and is organized as a Special Task Force under the command of a Zimbabwean brigadier. An additional 1,000 Zimbabwean militia members are helping guard transport routes in the Beira corridor and Tete Province. []

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Zimbabwean Concerns and Interests

We believe Mugabe dispatched troops to Mozambique in part as repayment for the substantial assistance the Machel government provided his liberation movement during the Rhodesian civil war.¹

¹ Machel denied the Smith regime the use of Mozambican routes to the sea. In addition, he allowed Mugabe's guerrillas to train in Tete Province and to infiltrate from there into Rhodesia. []


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Recent RENAMO Activity



Note: Based on [redacted] of approximately 1 November 1986. Milange has since returned to government control. The situation is fluid, and other towns may have changed hands as well. [redacted]

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In our judgment, however, Mugabe's key motive has been his desire to ensure continued access to Mozambican transport arteries, which provide Zimbabwe's fastest and cheapest outlets to the sea. The Beira-Mutare pipeline, for example, supplies about 90 percent of Zimbabwe's petroleum needs, and approximately 10 percent of Harare's external trade moves through the port of Beira and over Mozambican road and rail links, with the balance utilizing the South African transport system. [redacted]

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Mugabe's decision to provide greater military assistance to Mozambique appears designed to bolster Chissano, whom the Zimbabweans favored to succeed Machel, and to respond to RENAMO's unprecedented gains in central Mozambique. Since late September the insurgents have overrun a number of towns in Tete and Zambezia Provinces. [redacted]

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[redacted] they now control much of the lower Zambezi River valley. RENAMO also has intensified attacks in the Beira corridor and, to a lesser extent, in the southern provinces of the country. The US Embassy in Harare reports that approximately 60,000 Mozambicans have fled to Zimbabwe and that their numbers are swelling by about 2,000 a month. [redacted]

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[redacted] has estimated that Zimbabwe spends about \$15 million per month to support its force in Mozambique. The costs will rise significantly if Mugabe proceeds with plans to send a brigade now being formed to Mozambique and to purchase Soviet arms for the Mozambican campaign. [redacted]

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Mugabe's decision may also be a reaction to the increasingly unsettled political climate in the region and rising tensions between the Frontline States and Pretoria. In our judgment, Mugabe, who is one of southern Africa's foremost leaders and recently assumed the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement, may see providing support to a beleaguered neighbor as a way of standing up to Pretoria and burnishing his nationalist and Third World credentials. [redacted]

[redacted] many Zimbabwean military officers and enlisted men also have reservations about becoming more deeply involved in the conflict, in part because of their frustration with the poor performance of their Mozambican counterparts. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Zimbabweans are openly contemptuous of the Mozambicans' reluctance to fight and their inability to hold areas recaptured from RENAMO. The Zimbabweans also suspect—probably with reason, [redacted] that some of their allies are collaborating with RENAMO. For their part, the Mozambicans are jealous of the effectiveness of the British-trained Zimbabwean forces, [redacted]

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Domestic Repercussions

In our judgment, Zimbabwe's increasing commitment to Mozambique could prove unpopular at home and will continue to provoke considerable debate within the Cabinet, the ruling party, and the military. [redacted]

In addition, [redacted] are wary of deeper involvement in the fighting until they are assured that adequate ammunition, supplies, and tactical air support will be available. [redacted]

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[redacted] materiel shortages and other sources of disgruntlement have undermined morale to the point that Harare plans to institute mandatory political education for its forces there. [redacted]

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[] the education will be designed to convince soldiers that they are not simply fighting "Mozambique's war." []

[] the conflict has aggravated tribal frictions and that several Ndebele officers recently refused service in Mozambique, claiming that Mugabe's Shona-dominated government is requiring that the Ndebele bear a disproportionate share of the fighting. []

Prospects

In the short run, Harare is likely to increase its military presence along the Beira corridor and may provide troops to guard another major transport artery that once served Zimbabwe, the Maputo-Chicualacuala corridor. []

[] Zimbabwean troops are likely to participate in a counteroffensive in Tete Province aimed at rolling back recent rebel gains. Although we believe Harare could support a force in Mozambique of 10,000 for several months or more, as it did last year, the number of troops and how long they remain could depend on Zimbabwe's ability to provide needed logistic support. []

The Mugabe government also may bolster the modest training and logistic support it provides Maputo. Earlier this year, the Zimbabwean Army for the first time sent teams to Mozambique to train recruits, according to the US Embassy in Harare. Zimbabwe announced last month that it was extending a \$29 million credit to Mozambique that Maputo could use to buy uniforms, boots, and other nonlethal supplies, as well as a portion of Zimbabwe's large corn surplus. Harare almost certainly will also encourage other Frontline States to make similar commitments to the Chissano government. []

Although we believe a new Zimbabwean-led campaign could blunt the current RENAMO offensive and force the rebels to give up many of the towns they have occupied in the past two months, such tactical victories are likely to have little strategic importance if, as we expect, the insurgents voluntarily abandon many towns without a fight. The Zimbabwean drive that captured RENAMO headquarters in August 1985, for example, was not followed by a significant decline in rebel activity,

[] Moreover, in our judgment, the Beira corridor, as well as other transport arteries, will remain vulnerable to rebel attacks, despite the presence of more Zimbabwean troops. []

An increase in Zimbabwean casualties almost certainly would make the war more unpopular at home. Although we have no precise figures on casualties, the Embassy in Harare has noted that the death toll has been mounting—averaging 5 to 8 per week—and is sharply up from the level of two years ago. We also believe that the presence of 10,000 or more Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique for a protracted period could reduce Harare's ability to suppress tribal-related dissidence in southwestern Zimbabwe and tempt RENAMO to strike lightly guarded transportation and communications facilities along the border in eastern Zimbabwe. []

If the war goes poorly over the next year and domestic opposition mounts, Mugabe could feel compelled to renew efforts to get the Mozambican leadership to pursue peace talks with RENAMO. []

[] Nonetheless, Mugabe almost certainly would favor only a settlement that ensured Zimbabwe's continued access to the Beira corridor and left Mozambique's current leadership the dominant element in any new political arrangements. Similarly, Mugabe, in view of his longstanding antipathy toward Pretoria, would probably discourage Chissano from looking to South Africa to serve as a broker in peace talks. We believe that Mugabe is unlikely under present circumstances to counsel Chissano to seek Soviet or Cuban combat involvement in the war because such a course could provoke direct South African intervention and fan East-West tensions in the region. []

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Togo: Repercussions of the Coup Attempt

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Last September's unsuccessful attempt to overthrow President Eyadema is likely to worsen the already strained relations between Togo and Ghana and heighten Lome's suspicions of Burkinan intentions. Although, in our judgment, Eyadema's position has been strengthened by his handling of the coup attempt, the attempt sets a dangerous precedent, and dissident forces may now feel less inhibited about launching similar plots. France's decision to send troops to aid Togo probably has bolstered Paris's standing among Francophone West African leaders. Strong suspicions of Libyan involvement will add to the concern of moderate West African leaders that Tripoli is a major destabilizing force in the region.

Relations between Togo and Ghana have been strained for the past several years. Political differences are compounded by claims that each country is harboring the other's exiled dissidents. Tribal differences have also entered into play. Ghanaian President Rawlings belongs to the Ewe ethnic group, which has a sizable population in southern Togo, while Eyadema is a member of the Kabiye tribe from northern Togo.

The Attack

The attempted coup began on 23 September, when approximately 70 heavily armed men entered Lome from the neighboring town of Aflao, Ghana. According to the US Embassy in Lome, the rebel force was made up of Togolese dissidents, two Ghanaian soldiers, a Malian, a Burkinabe, and others of differing African nationalities. According to a US official who arrived in Lome shortly after the attack, the dissident force was divided into two groups. The first was to ambush and kill Eyadema as the second force attacked government targets in downtown Lome.

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According to the US official, his ambushers were ambushed themselves, and the second group of attackers were interdicted as they attempted to move into downtown Lome. Nevertheless, an undetermined number of the attackers were able to scatter in Lome, and 19 made it back to Ghana.

After a second outbreak of fighting the following day, Eyadema, citing the mutual defense accord, requested and received French military assistance. In two days of sporadic fighting, the government took 33 prisoners and killed an estimated 15 of the dissidents.

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An evaluation of the captured equipment indicated that the attackers were well armed but poorly trained, and may not have known how to use their weapons.

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Outside Involvement

Following the attack, Togolese officials accused Ghana and Burkina of training the dissidents, backing up their charges with documents taken from dissidents and confessions from prisoners. In a press

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The Olympio Brothers: Eyadema's Rivals for Power

[redacted] the sons of Togo's first president, the late Sylvanus Olympio, have repeatedly tried to seize power since their father's assassination in 1963. Gilchrist Sylvanus Olympio and his older brother Boniface, who want to avenge their father's death and restore the predominance of their Ewe tribe, are Eyadema's major security threat.



Jeune Afrique ©

Gilchrist Olympio, leader of the Movement for Democracy in Togo [redacted]

Gilchrist—The Jet-Setting Coup Plotter

Multimillionaire businessman Gilchrist Olympio, 49, is the founder and president of the Paris-based Movement for Democracy in Togo (MTD) and views himself as the president-in-waiting. Although criticized by some MTD members for devoting too much time to his own financial dealings, according to press reports, Gilchrist has launched several minor mercenary incursions in the past 20 years. Moreover, he has several important contacts among Ghanaian officials who are Ewes. He is a business associate of, and is close to, Kojo Tsikata. Gilchrist also once served as an "official" economic adviser to Rawlings. Although the MTD is based in France, Ghana is its biggest supporter, supplying arms, logistic support, and intelligence, and providing safehaven for its members. Gilchrist has told US diplomats that he has survived several assassination attempts by Eyadema's loyalists, and has twice been sentenced to death in absentia for coup plotting. [redacted]

Gilchrist has studied in Togo, Ghana, France, the United Kingdom (Oxford), and the United States (Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, and Boston University). After his father's death in 1963, Gilchrist served six years with the United Nations and the IMF. Since then his Texas-based engineering firm

has successfully cultivated business dealings in several countries in Africa, and he has holdings in France and the United Kingdom. [redacted]

Boniface

Boniface (Bonito) Olympio, about 53, heads the Accra division of the MTD. He has lived in Accra most of his adult life, claims Ghanaian citizenship, and has strong ties to the Ewe community. He runs a business in Accra, dines frequently with Tsikata, and has close contact with Rawlings. In our view, safety and comfort are Bonito's first priorities, and his ethnic ties are stronger than his patriotism. He does not espouse any particular ideology, but, as a student, was a member of the Communist Party, according to US Embassy reporting. He criticized his father for suppressing opposition parties in the early 1960s.

Bonito spent part of 11 years in England studying physics at Cambridge. He joined a British petroleum company in Accra after graduation and later worked as commercial director of a Ghana-based Italian petroleum agency. He returned to Togo in 1962 but fled to Ivory Coast after his father's assassination in 1963. He returned to Ghana three years later. [redacted]

Although Bonito is Europeanized and at times appears snobbish, he reportedly has an engaging personality. His wife is believed to be a former American citizen who lost her citizenship in 1959. She now travels on a British passport. [redacted]

The Olympios in Power

If the Olympios attained power in Togo, we believe they probably would adopt a more radical foreign policy. We think they would pursue closer relations with Ghana, Burkina, and Libya, in part to repay those states for their support during the struggle against Eyadema. Closer ties to more radical leaders in the region also could lead an Olympio regime to take a more radical position on international issues and at forums such as the United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement. [redacted]

Nevertheless, we believe the Olympios would seek to maintain strong ties to the West, especially France. In particular, the new leaders probably would continue to seek development assistance from Western financial institutions, in our view. [redacted]

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
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Unfused grenades captured from dissidents

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Factory-sealed crate of ammunition

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conference, the Minister of Interior said Ghanaian military I.D. cards and unexpired weapons authorization cards had been found on two of those killed in the fighting. A member of Ghanaian security admitted that the dissidents had trained in Ghana since 1984 and that several members of Ghana's paramilitary forces took part in the coup attempt,

[redacted] soldiers killed in the coup attempt were members of Rawlings's Personal Security unit under the command of Ghana's pro-Libyan Chief of Staff, Kojo Tsikata. The Togolese Minister of Interior stated that almost all of the dissidents said they had received additional military training in Burkina. [redacted]

In our judgment, the evidence indicates a Ghanaian hand in the coup attempt and strongly suggests that Tsikata was deeply involved. The attackers probably were trained in Ghana with Tsikata's blessing, and he appears to have been instrumental in funneling arms to the dissidents. Evidence is less clear, however, as to whether Rawlings played any role in the plot. We believe that he has little involvement in the day-to-day running of Ghana's government and has delegated much of his authority to advisers. [redacted]

Despite claims by some of the captured dissidents that they were trained in Libya, [redacted]

In our judgment, however, Libyan aid may well have

been provided in the context of Tripoli's overall support for dissidents opposing pro-Western countries throughout West Africa. [redacted]

Outlook

In our judgment, the coup attempt will heighten Togo's already strong suspicions that its more radical neighbors—especially Ghana—are bent on destabilizing its government. Eyadema has long seen Ghana as the source of all his troubles, and evidence of Ghanaian involvement will only fuel Eyadema's mistrust of Accra. We do not believe, however, that Eyadema is likely to retaliate by organizing Ghanaian dissidents living in Togo. [redacted]

In our judgment, Eyadema's domestic position probably has been strengthened by his handling of the attack. His longstanding argument that dissidents want to upset the peace in Togo has been given credence by the coup attempt. The President is likely to use the attack as an excuse to crack down further on internal dissidents. [redacted]

We believe the coup attempt could set a dangerous precedent for Togo. [redacted]

France's quick response to Eyadema's request for military support has bolstered Paris's image in the region, while new questions have been raised about Libya's regional intentions. Because there was little risk that French forces would actually be needed in the fighting, Paris gained political capital from the incident at relatively little cost. The widely held perception that Libya had a hand in the coup, however, is likely to make West African leaders more wary of expanding relations with Tripoli. [redacted]

**Burundi: Strains
With Libya**

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[REDACTED] According to the US Embassy, Bagaza is also frustrated by Tripoli's inability or unwillingness to fulfill promises of military and economic aid. Nevertheless, Bagaza has tried to maintain good ties to Tripoli to preserve his "revolutionary" credentials, and probably in the expectation of receiving greater economic and military assistance. In our view, Bagaza is likely to sustain his rhetorical backing for the Libyan leader but will probably continue to reject Tripoli's efforts to use Burundi as a base for Zairian dissidents. [REDACTED]

Bagaza has consented to Libya's use of Burundi for Qadhafi's propaganda efforts in central Africa, but within limits. The US Embassy reports that last January Libya sponsored an Islamic conference in Bujumbura, attended by 150 delegates from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Speakers attacked the United States as an "enemy of Islam," and the conference served as a forum for Qadhafi's propaganda. The meeting received no coverage in the government-controlled press, however, and the Embassy reports that Bagaza was embarrassed by the extremist rhetoric. The Embassy suspects that Bagaza only hosted the conference in return for an unspecified amount of economic aid. [REDACTED]

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Political Ties

Since diplomatic relations were established in 1975, Burundi has maintained polite ties to Libya without aligning itself too closely with Tripoli. US Embassy reports indicate that Bagaza has long been wary of Qadhafi's intentions, and in private he has been especially critical of Libyan intervention in Chad. Moreover, the Embassy reports that Qadhafi's state visit to Bujumbura in May 1985, far from cementing relations, further alienated the Burundian Government. According to the Embassy, Bagaza was embarrassed by Qadhafi's public tirade against France and Zaire, and, at one point, Radio Burundi cut off its live coverage of his remarks. [REDACTED]

Libya has sought unsuccessfully to recruit Burundi's small Muslim community—only 1 percent of the population is Muslim. [REDACTED] local Muslim leaders are unwilling to support terrorism or radical political activity on Tripoli's behalf. In recent months, Bujumbura has been irritated by Libya's insistence that 80 percent of the student body at the Islamic Center School—funded and built by Tripoli—be Muslim. Burundi, citing its small Islamic population, is threatening to keep all students from attending the school if the ratio is not changed, [REDACTED]

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Burundi has been angered by Libyan pressure for greater cooperation, especially in the foreign policy arena. [REDACTED]

Economic Relations

Libyan assistance has fallen short of Burundian expectations, and officials in Bujumbura regard the Libyans as tightfisted and unreliable partners. The US Embassy reports that, since the late 1970s, Libyan aid has centered on low-cost, high-visibility projects, such as a national library, a mosque, a radio station, a cultural center, and a bank. Burundi has unsuccessfully urged the Libyans to provide financial aid for projects with wider benefit, such as exploiting [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] According to US Embassy reporting, Burundi also claims that it has turned aside Tripoli's requests to use Bujumbura as a base for Libyan-backed Zairian dissidents to launch attacks against the Mobutu regime. [REDACTED]

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the country's nickel reserves or constructing roads. During his 1985 visit, Qadhafi promised to provide \$150 million over a three-year period to help the country pay its external debts. [redacted]

[redacted] Little, if any, of this aid has materialized, and [redacted] the Burundian Government does not believe Qadhafi's numerous pledges are sincere. [redacted]

Perhaps the most concrete example of Burundi's frustration with Libya is the dispute over their joint holding company. Created in 1975, the Libyan Arab-Burundi Holding Company controls an agricultural development project, a flour mill, and a major share of Bujumbura's largest hotel. [redacted]

[redacted] since last year the company has been paralyzed by conflicts between its Libyan and Burundian managers, and by Tripoli's insistence that it make all the company's decisions. [redacted]

The Military Connection

Since the mid-1970s, Libya has provided military equipment and training to Burundi. Between 1976 and 1979, for example, Burundi received some \$1.7 million worth of small arms and ammunition.

[redacted] delivered 240 tons of arms, including 20 Strella missiles, 2,000 rifles, and 1,000 machineguns. The US Embassy reports that some 500 Burundian military personnel, including 200 Army commandos and 33 pilots, received training in Libya from 1979 to 1981. [redacted]

In more recent years, however, the Burundian military has been increasingly frustrated with Libya's inadequate aid. Although Qadhafi pledged substantial military aid to Burundi during his visit in 1985, Tripoli appears to have delivered only two small aircraft this year—either Cessnas or Marchiatti SF-260s—and a variety of small arms and ammunition, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

[redacted] Burundi has requested high-speed patrol boats, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers, but we see nothing to

suggest that Tripoli will provide them. Moreover, Burundi has not sent military personnel to Libya for training, preferring the quality of French and Soviet programs. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe that, in the near term, relations between Burundi and Libya are likely to remain cool, with Bujumbura suspicious of Qadhafi's intentions and Tripoli unwilling to increase aid levels for what it probably regards as an uncooperative recipient. Tripoli's continuing financial problems will make it more difficult for Qadhafi to provide the significant levels of economic assistance needed to cultivate the Burundian Government. For his part, Bagaza is likely to be especially wary of Libyan efforts to recruit or organize the small Muslim community. He is obsessed with alleged threats from all religions, and would not hesitate to quash a nascent fundamentalist Islamic movement backed by Libya. Nonetheless, he will continue to offer modest support for Libya—largely limited to rhetoric and votes in the United Nations. Although Bagaza probably recognizes that there is little chance Tripoli will meet his aid requests, Burundi's economic problems will prompt him to keep all sources of revenue open. He is likely to back away from a closer alliance, however, for fear of provoking Zaire, Burundi's most powerful neighbor, or alienating key Western donors such as France and Belgium. [redacted]

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**Southern Africa: Fund for
Frontline States** [redacted]

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India, under Nonaligned Movement (NAM) auspices, is organizing a fund to provide economic aid to the Frontline States. The NAM summit in Harare last September approved the fund—known as the Africa Fund—to aid the Frontline States in their efforts to impose economic sanctions against South Africa. NAM members selected India as the chairman and Zambia as vice chairman of the fund's steering committee. Algeria, Argentina, Congo, Nigeria, Peru, and Zimbabwe are also on the committee. Committee members plan to meet later this month in New Delhi to formalize the administration of the fund and set the date for a pledging conference, which probably will take place early next year. [redacted]

Although the principal objective is to protect against South African retaliation when several of the Frontline States apply economic sanctions, fund sponsors also hope to aid South African and Namibian liberation movements and mobilize international public opinion against apartheid, [redacted]

[redacted] fund activities will be coordinated with those of the nine-nation Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which includes the six Frontline States. The two organizations will nonetheless have distinct functions: SADCC will continue to support projects that provide long-term benefits for the entire region, while the new organization will afford individual Frontline States immediate aid to meet pressing food, energy, transport, and manpower needs. The new fund will probably not channel direct military assistance to the Frontline States but could indirectly enhance their security by providing nonlethal equipment and training assistance. [redacted]

Leaders of the Frontline States have discussed the possibility of creating such a fund on several occasions during the past few years. Preparations by Zambia and Zimbabwe to impose selected sanctions against South Africa undoubtedly have given a sense of urgency to establishing the fund at this time.

The Frontline and SADCC States

Frontline States

*Angola
Botswana
Mozambique
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe*

SADCC States

*Angola
Botswana
Lesotho
Malawi
Mozambique
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe*

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Nonetheless, many potential contributors—whether NAM, Communist, or Western states—are facing financial difficulties and are unlikely to provide more than token assistance. In addition, Frontline governments will find it difficult to coordinate their activities in view of their varying interests and vulnerability to South African reprisals. As a result, fund activities are unlikely to compensate for countermeasures Pretoria could adopt, or significantly reduce the Frontline States' considerable dependence on South African trade and transport links. [redacted]

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Africa Briefs

Zimbabwe

Political Prisoner Released

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The Mugabe government's freeing earlier this month of a prominent political prisoner was probably intended to demonstrate the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union's good faith in unity talks with Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The imprisonment of Dumiso Dabengwa, Nkomo's military intelligence chief during the Rhodesian war and later a key aide, was a sticking point in negotiations between the two parties. Although we believe Dabengwa's release will advance the talks, difficult issues remain. Mugabe and Nkomo have yet to agree, for example, on how government and party posts will be allocated once a formal merger occurs. [REDACTED]

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Dabengwa, an outspoken maverick known to have pro-Soviet sympathies, is one of ZAPU's most popular leaders. He also is widely regarded as one of the country's best military strategists. He initially was detained on treason charges in 1982, two years after independence, when security officials discovered arms caches on ZAPU property. Although Dabengwa was acquitted of coup plotting in 1983, the government promptly detained him again under emergency powers. He had been held without charges until his release earlier this month. Dabengwa, who is 47, probably has increased his stature within ZAPU and his prospects of one day succeeding Nkomo through his lengthy incarceration, according to the US Embassy. [REDACTED]

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Mauritius

Drug Scandal

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Prime Minister Jugnauth moved decisively last month against party and police officials implicated in drug dealing in an effort to protect his moderate coalition government from criticism by the leftist opposition. His Militant Socialist Party, which dominates the four-party coalition, expelled party deputies Boodhoo and Poonith, and accepted the resignation of a Politburo member. Boodhoo, Jugnauth's chief political rival, subsequently resigned from parliament. The expulsions probably also spurred the ouster of several members of one of the other coalition parties. The moves were prompted by testimony against party members during a recent government-sponsored inquiry into high-level drug dealings following the arrest last December of four Mauritian parliament members in Amsterdam on drug charges. In addition, the government suspended 34 members of the police force, including senior law enforcement officials, for allegedly accepting bribes from traffickers. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] Jugnauth is determined to rid his party of those implicated in the drug affair and believes that bold action will turn events to his advantage. In our judgment, Jugnauth's purge of tainted party officials will help him counter charges by the opposition of indifference to the drug problem. Moreover, the government's recent proposal to impose the death penalty for traffickers will further distance him from the scandal. The exposure of additional dealings at high levels of the government, however, would probably prompt Jugnauth to call for an early election to preserve his reputation and undertake further housecleaning measures. [redacted]

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Liberia

Drug Smuggling [redacted]

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Narcotics trafficking may be on the rise in Liberia, according to US Embassy and defense attache reporting. [redacted]

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[redacted] the US Embassy reports that several illegal drug shipments transiting the airport en route to Europe have been confiscated by the government. According to US Embassy reporting, the airport probably serves as a transshipment point for heroin from Nigeria, and heroin and cocaine from Ghana. [redacted] that airport security is generally lax because of inadequate training and corruption. Overland trafficking is also a problem, with an average of three arrests—usually of Ivoirians—each month in Nimba County for marijuana smuggling, [redacted] [redacted] In our view, the country's economic decline will encourage more drug smuggling operations as Liberians seek alternative sources of income. [redacted]

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~~Secret~~**Senegal****Agreements With IMF**

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The IMF (International Monetary Fund) approved a new \$90 million Stand-by Agreement and Structural Adjustment Facility for Senegal in mid-November. The agreements are designed to boost economic growth, reduce the rate of inflation, and cut the current account deficit. Dakar's ambitious 1986/87 economic reform program is designed to achieve a growth rate of about 4 percent, to lower inflation from 9 percent to less than 7 percent, and to reduce the current account deficit from an estimated 13.2 percent of GDP in 1985/86 to about 9 percent, according to press reports.

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To reach its goals, Dakar plans to increase incentives for agricultural production, renew efforts to collect back taxes, and privatize some parastatals. Senegal depends on agricultural exports—specifically peanuts—as its major source of foreign currency, but in recent years the country has suffered from prolonged drought and an insect plague. In our view, the ability of farmers to rebound from these natural disasters will play an important part in the success of the economic reform program. Dakar also faces a tough battle in selling the reform measures to powerful interest groups such as the Islamic brotherhoods, which are profiting from the present system.

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